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This essay reviews recent developments in neurobiology which are beginning to expose
the mechanisms that underlie some elements of decision-making that bear on attributions
of responsibility. These “elements” have been mainly studied in simple perceptual deci-
sion tasks, which are performed similarly by humans and non-human primates. Here we
consider the role of neural noise, and suggest that thinking about the role of noise can shift
the focus of discussions of randomness in decision-making away from its role in enabling
alternate possibilities and toward a potential grounding role for responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
As neuroscience begins to expose the brain mechanisms that give
rise to decisions, what do the assortment of facts tell us about such
philosophical concepts as responsibility and free will? To many,
these concepts seem threatened because of an inability to recon-
cile a truly free choice with either deterministic brain mechanisms
on the one hand or stochastic effects on the other. The former
seem to negate the notion of choice by rendering it predictable, at
least in principle, or as being under the control of forces external
to the agent. The latter reduces choice to caprice, a weak freedom
that precludes anymeaningful assignment of responsibility. In this
essay, we offer an alternative perspective that is informed by the
neural mechanisms that underlie decision-making.
Some of these mechanisms point to features that distinguish
agents from each other and allow us to understand why one agent
might make a better or worse choice than another agent. We
suggest that more attention be paid to these aspects of decision-
making, and that such attentionmay help bridge the neurobiology
of decision-making (NBDM)andphilosophical problems in ethics
and metaphysics. Our idea is not that the neurobiology supports
one particular philosophical position, but that certain principles
of the NBDM are relevant to ethicists of many a philosophical
persuasion.
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY
Figure 1 shows in broad brushstrokes themain philosophical posi-
tions regarding free will. In the philosophical literature, theorists
can be classiﬁed according to the relation they see between the
truth of determinism and the possibility of freedom.
To some, themore knowledgewehave about theworkings of the
brain, the less it seems possible that we exercise free will when we
make choices, and the less it seems that we can be held responsible
for our decisions (Crick, 1994; Schall, 2001; Greene and Cohen,
2004; Glimcher, 2005). It is not just the physicalist concept that the
mind is the brain, but that as we come to understand more about
how the brain gives rise to choices, mechanisms seem to displace
freedom. At least some philosophers and many neuroscientists
wonder whether moral responsibility is something that we would
reject if we knew everything about the machinery of the human
brain. They worry that the neuroscience of decision-making will
render concepts like free will and responsibility “quaint ﬁctions” –
although perhaps essential ones that we rely upon as social agents.
As theNBDMexposes themechanisms that underlie choice behav-
ior, our agency seems to be replaced by amachine that converts cir-
cumstances into an outcome without any real choice at all. NBDM
is thus perceived by many as supporting “hard determinism”1:
rendering the cause–effect chains with a modern brush.
Compatibilists argue that determinism does not strip the agent
of choice, responsibility, or freedom (Frankfurt, 1971; Straw-
son, 1974; Hume, 1975/1748; Dennett, 1984; Bok, 1998; Black-
burn, 1999; James, 2005/1884). Indeed, some compatibilists deny
that the practice of ethics, and the concept of responsibility
which it presupposes, depends upon any reconciliation of human
action with fundamental physics for justiﬁcation (Strawson, 1974;
Williams, 1985). Even if one adopts a compatibilist view, however,
there is no particular reason to exclude neuroscientiﬁc facts from
ethical discussion. Although neuroscience is not foundational to
ethics, it has the potential to illuminate capacities and limitations
of a decision maker. Capacities like impulsivity and rationality are
obvious examples.
1Hard determinism is the position that (a) freedom is incompatible with determin-
ism, and (b) determinism is true. Many hard determinist arguments are based on
the inexorability of causal chains and the resultant lack of ability to do otherwise.
For more deﬁnitions of technical terms, see Box 1.
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Box 1 Some definitions.
Physicalism: The thesis that all that exists is physical or supervenes on the physical.
Reductionism: The thesis that all complex systems can be explained by explaining their component elements.
Emergent properties: New properties that arise in a complex system as a result of low-level interactions.
Eliminativism:The view that the terms we use to describe a domain are either redundant or in error and thus could be eliminated from our
discourse.
Neural noise: Variability in neural signal not tied to the signaling function of the neuron.
Compatibilism: The thesis that free will is compatible with determinism.
Incompatibilism: The thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism.
Hard determinism: The view that free will is incompatible with determinism, determinism is true, and we therefore lack freedom.
Libertarian free will: Free will dependent on indeterminism; the main idea is that indeterminism allows agents to break free of the chain of
causation.
Determinism Indeterminism
Free
and 
MR
No Free 
Will; No
MR
Compatibilism Libertarianism
Hard 
determinism
Incompatibilism
Hard Incompatibilism
FIGURE 1 | Basic layout of traditional positions in philosophy
regarding the relation of free will (FW) and moral responsibility (MR)
to determinism. Compatibilism is the view that FW and MR are
compatible with a deterministic universe. Incompatibilism is the view that
they are not. Incompatibilists come in a variety of ﬂavors: Hard determinists
think that determinism is true and we are not free; Libertarians believe that
determinism is false and we are free in virtue of indeterminism. Hard
incompatibilists believe that FW and MR are impossible, for they are not
compatible with either determinism or indeterminism.There are a variety of
compatibilist positions that provide different accounts of how FW and MR
are not threatened by determinism. There are also accounts (not discussed
here) that separate the conditions for FW and MR, and thus allow that MR
is possible in a deterministic universe even if FW is not. These are
sometimes referred to as versions of compatibilism, and sometimes called
semi-compatibilism.
In this essay, we explain why we think that neuroscience reveals
aspects of decision-making with the potential to illuminate our
conception of ethical responsibility.
Like nearly all neuroscientists, we accept physicalism. All mat-
ters mental are caused by brains. This leaves open the possi-
bility that not every aspect of our thoughts and feelings can
be adequately expressed in reductionist terms. We leave open
the possibility of emergent phenomena: properties that arise
from simpler causes but which are not explained away by
them2.
Our goal is to demonstrate a correspondence between neural
mechanisms and some elements that compatibilists have long sus-
pected must be present. Rather than “explain away” free will, the
neurobiology enhances our conception of ourselves as having will,
agency, authorship, and real options. In the end, we hope to con-
vince a certain kind of compatibilist that neuroscience matters in
ways that he tends to miss because he is so focused on dismissing
the entire body of physical knowledge wielded by the hard deter-
minist to argue against freedomand responsibility.Andwe hope to
convince the incompatibilist that neuroscience can be explanatory
without rendering responsibility and free will quaint but illusory.
FREE WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY
Having free will minimally implies that when I choose A (i) I do so
with some degree of autonomy, and (ii) in some sense, I could have
made another choice3. The ﬁrst condition implies ownership of
the choice. My choice cannot be explained entirely by forces out-
side the ones I control as an agent. The second means that there
is a real alternative and that I could choose that alternative. Our
arguments here will focus on the former condition, although they
have some impact on the second as well.
Most people take it that moral responsibility implies freedom:
One can only be responsible if one is free. For someone to be held
responsible for an action, they must be, in some sense, a cause of
that action. Moreover, assignment of moral responsibility is rela-
tive to the properties of a decision maker or agent. This invites us
to explain a relevant part of the decision as depending fundamen-
tally on properties of the deciding agent. The relevant properties
are, loosely, what we refer to as constitution, temperament, values,
interests, passions, capacities, and so forth. In our discussion of
the neurobiology, we will refer to such properties as policies that
govern parameters of the decision-making process, such as the
tradeoff between speed and accuracy.
2A highly intuitive discussion of emergence can be found in Gazzaniga’s (2011)
recent book. The concept of emergence is a matter of ongoing debate in philosophy
(e.g. see Kim, 2010 for discussion). Our arguments do not depend on a metaphys-
ically demanding notion of emergence, but rather on a weak notion of emergence
that prevents radical eliminativism of high-level properties.
3There is considerable philosophical dispute about in what sense (ii) must be true,
and some have argued that it is not essential, or that it can be true even if there is
only one way the world can evolve (Frankfurt, 1971; Dennett, 1984; Vihvelin, 2012).
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PREDICTABILITY AND DETERMINISM
Some scientists might conceptualize the problem a little differ-
ently than the organization depicted in Figure 1, but the same
basic elements are present: causes and effects, randomness and
predictability (Crick, 1994; Schall, 2001; Glimcher, 2005). Many
neuroscientists, physicists, and mathematical theorists subscribe
to the following position: they are (1) physicalists who (2) believe
the mental is explained by a physical brain through chains of
causation, but (3) they also embrace some elements of ran-
domness. The randomness can be fundamental indeterminism,
based on principles of quantum mechanics, or it can be uncer-
tainty that arises from complexity in a deterministic system whose
quantum effects are negligible. This randomness implies that
an agent’s choices are not practically predictable from the his-
tory of events or the state of the brain beyond probabilistic
expectations.
Libertarians deny that freedom is compatible with determin-
ism, but believe that indeterminism is true and makes freedom
possible (Kane, 2002). Many scientists likewise deny that freedom
is compatible with determinism, and reject the notion that the
universe (or brain) is determined, because of the likelihood of ran-
domness. However, unlike Libertarians, they reject the idea that
randomness confers freedom or responsibility. Let us call them
“Scientiﬁc Hard Incompatibilists” or SHIs. SHIs think the sources
of randomness provide the basis for a physical understanding of
the unpredictable, and recognize that in the real world even deter-
ministic processes are coupled with a randomness that muddies
the deterministic machinery from the perspectives of both actor
and the observer. Prediction is imperfect. Choices can be dissected
into determined and random components (necessity and chance).
However, and perhaps ironically, SHIs also believe that random-
ness cannot confer freewill and responsibility. There is no“willing”
and certainly no responsibility for a choice that is explained only
by randomness. In this sense, “Chance is as relentless as necessity”
(Blackburn, 1999). Therefore, the SHI concludes that free will and
responsibility are illusory.
By focusing on the question only of whether low-level deter-
ministic or indeterministic processes make room for free will and
responsibility, we believe SHI’s dissection leaves out something
essential. As explained in the next section, the neurobiology invites
us to view uncertainty not so much as it bears on predictability
but on the strategy that an agent adopts when making a choice in
the face of uncertainty. The neurobiology sheds light on how these
strategies are implemented and therefore why one decision maker
may make one choice, whereas another individual may choose
differently.
NEUROBIOLOGY OF DECISION-MAKING
Here we provide a brief and highly selective review of some ﬁnd-
ings in neuroscience about the neural bases of decision-making.
Neurobiology is beginning to illuminate the mechanisms that
explain why one agent makes one choice, whereas another would
choose differently.Wediscuss the role of randomness in explaining
such choices. The role that this randomness plays in our argu-
ment is not to confer freedom but to necessitate high-level policies
regarding decisions. Although these policies themselves do not
immediately provide conceptual grounding for responsibility, they
provide a potential locus for philosophical arguments linking the
nature of the agent to his or her decisions.
SIMPLE DECISIONS
A decision is a commitment to a proposition or plan, and a deci-
sion process encompasses the steps that lead to this commitment,
what is often termed deliberation among options. These options
may take the form of actions, plans, hypotheses, or propositions.
Most decisions are based on a variety of factors: evidence bearing
on prior knowledge about the options, prior knowledge concern-
ing the relative merit of the options, expected costs and rewards
associated with the matrix of possible decisions and their out-
comes, and other costs associated with gathering evidence (e.g.,
the cost of elapsed time). This formulation is not exhaustive, but
it covers many types of decisions, ranging from simple to com-
plex. Because the elements listed in this paragraph play a role in
simple decisions as well as complex ones, it is possible to study the
NBDM in non-human animals, including our evolutionarily close
relatives, monkeys. This research has begun to expose basic prin-
ciples that are applicable to the more complex decisions we make
in our lives, including those for which we can be held morally
responsible.
The process of deciding generally has a beginning and an end.
For perceptual decisions about the direction of motion, like the
one depicted in Figure 2A,B, the onset of a random-dot visual
stimulus marks the beginning of the decision process. Of course,
other aspects of the decision process are already in play before
this. They might be lumped together as establishing the rules
of engagement from various contextual cues: something in the
brain establishes that a decision is to be made in the ﬁrst place,
that the source of information resides in a region of the visual
ﬁeld, that the useful information is encoded by a set of neu-
rons in the visual cortex, and that the mode of response will
be an eye movement to a target. The stream of information
from the stimulus is processed by speciﬁc regions in visual cor-
tex, which supply a stream of evidence to downstream processes.
This momentary evidence furnishes a fresh piece of information
at each instant that bears on the decision process. These bits of
evidence are accumulated until there is enough to render a deci-
sion. Mainly for convenience, we term this commitment point the
end of the decision process. After that, either an action ensues to
communicate or enact the decision, or there is some delay dur-
ing which such an action is planned (the occasional change of
mind is understood as a second decision process; Resulaj et al.,
2009).
We know much about the neurobiology underlying this type
of simple decision. The stream of momentary evidence comes
from neurons in the visual cortex, concentrated in an area of
the macaque brain called the middle temporal visual area (MT;
also known as V5). These neurons respond better when motion
through their receptive ﬁelds is in one direction andnot in another.
They have a background discharge, which is modulated by the
random-dot motion stimulus. If the neuron prefers rightward
motion, then it tends to produce action potentials at a faster
rate when motion is to the right than when it is to the left.
When the decision is difﬁcult – that is, when only a small frac-
tion of randomly appearing dots actually move to the right at
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FIGURE 2 | Neural mechanism of a decision about direction of motion.
(A) Choice-reaction time (RT) version of the direction discrimination task. The
subject views a patch of dynamic random dots and decides the net direction
of motion. The decision is indicated by an eye movement to a peripheral
target. The subject controls the viewing duration by terminating each trial with
an eye movement whenever ready. The gray patch shows the location of the
response ﬁeld (RF) of an LIP neuron. (B) Effect of stimulus difﬁculty on choice
accuracy and decision time. Solid curves are ﬁts of a diffusion model, which
accounts simultaneously for choice and decision time. (C) Response of LIP
neurons during decision formation. Average ﬁring rate from 54 LIP neurons is
shown for three levels of difﬁculty. Responses are grouped by motion
strength and direction of choice, as indicated. Left graph, The responses are
aligned to onset of random-dot motion and truncated at the median RT. These
responses accompany decision formation. Shaded insert shows average
responses from direction selective neurons in area MT to motion in the
preferred and anti-preferred directions (solid and dashed traces, respectively).
After a transient, MT responds at a nearly constant rate. The LIP ﬁring rates
approximate the integral of a difference in ﬁring rate between MT neurons
with opposite direction preferences. Right graph,The responses are aligned to
the eye movement. ForTin choices (solid curves), all trials reach a stereotyped
ﬁring rate before saccade initiation.We think this level represents a threshold
or bound, which is sensed by other brain regions to terminate the decision.
(D) Responses grouped by RT. Only Tin choices are shown. Arrow shows the
stereotyped ﬁring rate occurs ∼70ms before saccade initiation. Adapted with
permission from Gold and Shadlen (2007) insert from on line-data base used
in Britten et al. (1992), www.neuralsignal.org data base nsa2004.1.
any moment – the same neuron increases its discharge albeit less
vigorously. When the motion is leftward but not strongly coher-
ent, the neuron also increases its discharge, though now to an even
lesser degree. For strong motion to the left the neuron would
typically discharge at the background rate or possibly slightly
below. The mechanisms for extracting this momentary evidence
about direction are reasonablywell understood (Born andBradley,
2005). It is also clear from lesion and microstimulation experi-
ments that these MT neurons supply this evidence to the decision
process (for reviews, see Parker and Newsome, 1998; Gold and
Shadlen, 2007).
The decision on this task beneﬁts from an accumulation of evi-
dence in time. The direction selective sensory neurons described
in the previous paragraph do not accumulate evidence (Figure 2C,
inset). Their responses represent the momentary information in
the stimulus. Other neurons, which reside in association cortex,
represent the accumulation of this momentary evidence. A key
property of neurons in these areas – the vast majority of the cor-
tical mantle in primates – is the capacity to maintain discharge
for longish periods in the absence of an immediate sensory stim-
ulus, or an immediate motor effect. The exact parameterization
of “longish” is not known, but it is at least in the seconds range.
This is in marked contrast to sensory neurons like the ones dis-
cussed above, which keep up with a changing environment (tens
of milliseconds) or motor neurons, which cause changes in body
musculature on a similar timescale. Indeed it is likely that this ﬂexi-
bility in timescale underliesmany of the higher cognitive capacities
that we cherish.
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Someof these neurons in association cortex produce ﬁring rates
that reﬂect the accumulated evidence from the motion stimulus.
For example, neurons in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) in pari-
etal cortex respond to visual stimuli in a restricted portion of space,
termed the response ﬁeld (RF), but they also respond when the RF
has been cued as a potential target of an eye movement. These
neurons “associate” information from vision with plans to look
(Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Andersen, 1995; Mazzoni et al., 1996;
Colby and Goldberg, 1999; Lewis and Van Essen, 2000). During
the decision process, these LIP neurons represent the accumulated
evidence that one of the choice targets is a better choice (given
the task) than the other. While MT neurons are producing spikes
at a roughly constant rate, neurons in LIP gradually increase or
decrease their rate of discharge as more evidence mounts for or
against one of the choices. If the stimulus is turned off and a delay
period ensues, MT neurons return to their baseline ﬁring rates,
but LIP neurons, whose response ﬁelds contain the chosen tar-
get, emit a sustained discharge that indicates the outcome of the
decision-effectively, a plan tomake an eyemovement to that target.
When the decision maker is permitted to answer at will, the
LIP neurons also lend insight into the mechanism whereby the
decision terminates. As shown in Figures 2C,D, the decision ends
when the ﬁring rates of certain LIP neurons achieve a critical level.
Whether the decision was based on strong or weak evidence and
whether the process transpired quickly or not, the LIP responses
achieve the same level of discharge at themoment of decision. This
is an indication that there is a threshold for terminating the deci-
sion process. Since the LIP ﬁring rate represents the accumulation
of momentary evidence, the termination “rule” is to commit to a
choice when the accumulated evidence reaches a critical level. For
example, the rule might be: if the rightward preferring MT neu-
rons have produced∼6 spikes per neuron more than the leftward
preferring neurons, choose right; else if the leftward preferringMT
neurons have produced∼6 spikes per neuronmore that the right-
ward preferring neurons, choose left; else continue to accumulate
evidence. This implies that LIP neurons are effectively computing
the integral of the difference in ﬁring rates between rightward and
leftward preferring MT neurons (Ditterich et al., 2003; Huk and
Shadlen, 2005; Hanks et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2007).
This mechanism of accumulation of evidence to a threshold
level is called bounded accumulation (or bounded drift–diffusion,
or random walk to bound; Figure 3). The idea was developed
in the 1940s as a statistical process for deciding between alter-
natives (Wald, 1947), and it played a key role in British wartime
code-breaking (Good, 1979). It has found application in areas of
sensory psychology (Link, 1992) and cognitive psychology (Rat-
cliff and Rouder, 2000; Usher andMcClelland, 2001; Bogacz et al.,
2006). In all of these cases the threshold for terminating the deci-
sion process,what wewill call the“bound,”controls both the speed
and the accuracy of the decision process (e.g., Figure 2B). This
tradeoff is an example of a policy that the brain implements to
shape its decisions.
Typically, when a stream of evidence is available, a decision
maker will tend to make fewer errors if she takes more time. In
the motion task, it appears that this is achieved by raising the level
of the bound for terminating the decision process. This simple
adjustment to the mechanism leads to longer decision times and
tomore reliable evidence at the point of termination (Palmer et al.,
Choose h
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FIGURE 3 | Models of bounded evidence accumulation.
(A) Random walk or drift diffusion. Noisy momentary evidence
for/against hypotheses h1 and h2 is accumulated (irregular trace) until
it reaches an upper or lower termination bound, leading to a choice in
favor of h1 or h2. In the motion task, h1 and h2 are opposite directions
(e.g., right and left). The momentary evidence is the difference in ﬁring
rates between pools of direction selective neurons that prefer right
and left. At each moment, this difference is a noisy draw from a
Gaussian distribution with mean proportional to motion strength. The
mean difference is the expected drift rate of the diffusion process.
(B) Competing accumulators. The same mechanism is realized by two
accumulators that race. If the evidence for h1 and h2 are opposite,
then the race is mathematically identical to symmetric drift–diffusion.
The race is a better approximation to the physiology, since there are
neurons in LIP that accumulate evidence for each of the choices. This
mechanism extends to account for choices and RT when there are
more than two alternatives. Reprinted with permission from Gold and
Shadlen (2007).
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2005). In the case of the motion experiment, the policy is estab-
lishing the tradeoff between speed and accuracy of the direction
judgments. The resultant payoff is something like the rate over
which reward is obtained and errors avoided (Gold and Shadlen,
2002; Bogacz et al., 2006).
The neurobiology underlying the setting of the bound (and
detecting that the accumulation in LIP has reached the bound) is
not currently known; it ought to be an area of intense study. The
most promising candidate mechanisms involve the basal ganglia.
These structures seem to possess the requisite circuitry to termi-
nate the decision process based on a threshold crossing and to
adjust the bound based on cues about how the current “policy” for
making decisions is paying off (Bogacz et al., 2006; Lo and Wang,
2006).
Neurobiology supports the view that a decision process bal-
ances evidence gathering with other “policy” factors. Other factors
that affect simple decisions also assert themselves in the negotia-
tion between evidence and bound. These include valuation of – or
relative weight assigned to – (i) potential rewards and punish-
ments associated with success and failure (for reviews, see Sugrue
et al., 2005; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011), (ii) prior knowledge in the
absence of new evidence about which of the alternatives is likely
to be correct (Hanks et al., 2011), (iii) social and emotional fac-
tors, and (iv) the passage of time itself. Elapsed time is associated
with opportunity costs and alters the value of an expected reward.
There may also be a deadline to complete a decision by a certain
point in time. Interestingly, the neurons that encode accumulated
evidence in the motion task also encode elapsed time (Leon and
Shadlen, 2003; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Maimon and Assad,
2006) in a way that incorporates the sense of urgency in the deci-
sion process (Drugowitsch et al., 2012). We suggest that increased
attention to these elements, and their role in decision-making will
provide insight into the active role of the agent in shaping decision
processes.
NOISE
The picture we have painted thus far captures some of the impor-
tant neurobiological determinants of decisions, but an important
aspect has been left out. That is the issue of noise.
The mechanisms outlined so far are causal mechanisms, and as
such one might think that these mechanisms will always evolve in
the same way under the same circumstances. However, the neu-
rons that represent evidence – whether from vision (Britten et al.,
1992) or via associations of cues with their bearing on a propo-
sition (Yang and Shadlen, 2007) – do so in a “noisy” way. These
neurons do not convey the same number of action potentials per
unit time even when they are exposed to the identical condition
over and over (at least as identical as can be tested in the labo-
ratory). There is nothing magical about this noise, although the
source of noise remains unknown, as does whether it reﬂects fun-
damentally deterministic or indeterministic processes. As far as
we understand, the existence of noise does not confer any spe-
cial properties, like freedom,will, consciousness, etc. However, the
noise does have very real effects. For example, errors in perceptual
decisions can be traced to the variable discharge of cortical neu-
rons (Parker and Newsome, 1998). There are two ways to think
that noise might bear upon our understanding of freedom and
responsibility. The ﬁrst concerns the source of noise, and the
second its effects.
What is the source of noise?
The origins of noise in the neocortex are probably in the com-
plexity of synaptic integration with large numbers of excitatory
and inhibitory inputs (Shadlen and Newsome, 1994, 1998; van
Vreeswijk and Sompolinsky, 1996).
The representation of information by neurons is affected by
noise. Moreover, this noise is an ineliminable aspect of brain
function. Even in the parts of the brain that are reasonably well
understood, such as the visual cortex, when the exact same stim-
ulus is presented in a highly controlled setting, a neuron might
emit 10 spikes on one exposure, 6 on the next, 17 on the next,
and so on. In the neocortex, if the mean spike rate is 10 spikes in
some epoch (say 1/4 s), then variance is typically about 15. The
square root of this number, the SD, is just under 4. Roughly then,
we might characterize the count as a random number that tends
to be near 10 but falls between 2 and 18 (±2 SDs of 10) with 95%
probability. That is a very large range of variability.
Of course, there are many neurons in any patch of cortex. So
the brain can achieve an improvement in this variability by aver-
aging the spikes from many neurons. However, there is a limit to
this improvement because the neurons are weakly correlated, and
thus share some variability. It has been shown that the improve-
ment in signal to noise can only be reduced by a factor of about
3 (Zohary et al., 1994; Shadlen and Newsome, 1998; Mazurek and
Shadlen, 2002). This is one of the reasons that neuroscientists can
record activity from single neurons and ﬁnd them so informa-
tive about what an entire neural population, and even an animal,
senses, decides, and does.
Although it is commonly said that neurons compute with
spikes, this truism obscures a deeper truth about the currency
of information exchange the cortex. Cortical neurons compute
with spike rates. They access information from other neurons even
in the temporal gaps between the spikes of any one neuron that
contributes information to a computation. In many subcortical
structures and in many simpler nervous systems, a neuron emits a
spike if only one (or a few) of its inputs are active. The inputs are
simple or relatively sparse, and these neurons effectively pass on
the action potentials from those inputs. In contrast, neurons in the
cortex compute new information by combining quantities poten-
tially representing many different things: position of a stimulus in
the left eye’s view compared to the right or whether a quantity x
is greater than another quantity y and if so, by how much. The
numbers that are to be added, subtracted, and compared are not
just all or none. They are intensities: contrast, level of evidence,
etc. For the new computation to occur, it would be inefﬁcient for
a neuron to wait through the period between spikes arriving from
the various inputs that represent, for example, x and y. Instead,
the circuit establishes a representation of x and y that is present
through the interspike interval of any one neuron.
To achieve this, many neurons represent x and y. That way, in a
very narrow time window (e.g.,∼1/100 s) the neuron that is doing
the comparison gets a sample of the intensities of x and y, as rep-
resented by many neurons. This calculating neuron gets to know
x by averaging the spikes and silences across neurons instead of
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averaging the spikes (and silences) from one neuron across time.
That makes for a fast cortex that can compute new things. But it
poses a problem. We know that it takes only ∼10–20 excitatory
inputs in a few ms epoch to make a neuron ﬁre. If we think about
the number of inputs that are needed to achieve the computations
in question – that is to permit calculations with numbers rang-
ing from 10 to 100 spikes per second, it turns out we need on
order 100 neurons representing x and another 100 that represent
y. That would lead to far too many resultant spikes – there would
be a surfeit of excitation. Neurons would not be able to main-
tain a graded range of responses: they would quickly saturate their
ﬁring rates.
To counter this, the cortex balances excitation with inhibition
(Shadlen and Newsome, 1994). In cortex, when a neuron is driven
to discharge at a higher rate, both the rate of its excitatory input
and inhibitory input increase. In fact, we think there is a delicate
balance that allows this to work. It controls the dynamic range of
ﬁring. Now the spiking occurs when the neuron has accumulated
an excess of excitation compared to inhibition. But since both are
occurring, the effect is like a particle in Brownian motion. The
neuron’s state (e.g., membrane voltage) wanders until it bumps
into a positive threshold and produces a spike. The net effect
is a preservation of dynamic range among inputs and outputs,
but the cost is irregularity. The spikes occur when the random
path (called a random walk) of voltage happens to bump into a
threshold. That is an irregular process. In fact it explains the high
irregularity that one typically observes when recording from cor-
tical neurons. It explains the variance of the spikes counted in an
epoch. That irregularity also results in asynchronous spiking. That
means another neuronwill not be fooled into“thinking” that spike
rate has increased because spikes from several neurons arrive all at
the same time.
There are a number of interesting implications of this mecha-
nism, but the one we wish to emphasize concerns the relationship
between inputs and outputs. There is an important intuition that
one ought to have about diffusion and random walks. It is that
the state variable that undergoes the walk – what we are thinking
of here as membrane voltage – tends to meander from its starting
position by a distance given roughly by the square root of the num-
ber of steps it has taken multiplied by the size of a unitary step.
Suppose that the amount of depolarization required to generate
a spike is equivalent to 20 excitatory steps. Then for the random
walk, we would expect it to take 400 steps (half excitatory and half
inhibitory) for the membrane voltage to meander this far from its
starting point, on average. And, approximately half the time the
displacement is in the wrong direction, away from spike threshold.
This intuition allows us to appreciate why a balance of excitation
and inhibition allows a cortical neuron to operate in a regime in
which it is bombarded with many inputs from other neurons. The
random walk achieves a kind of compression in number of input
events to output events.
So why are neurons noisy? It is an inescapable price the neo-
cortex pays for its ability to combine andmanipulate information.
To perform their computations, cortical neurons receive many
excitatory inputs from other neurons, and they must balance this
excitation with inhibition (balanced E/I). Balanced E/I leads to the
variable discharge that is observed in electrode recordings.
The effects of noise
The fact that this variability exists is not controversial, although
its implications are often debated (Glimcher, 2005; Faisal et al.,
2008). One particularly relevant fact that is not disputed is that
this variability is a source of errors in simple decisions. Noise lim-
its perceptual sensitivity andmotor precision. This fact makes one
very suspicious of claims that the variability is just due to causes
that the experimenter has not controlled for (or cannot control;
e.g., variation in motivational state). That would be a valid con-
cern were it not for the fact that the rest of the brain also does
not seem to know that this variability is not part of the signals it
uses for subsequent computation and behavior. Were the causes
of variability in sensory evidence known to the rest of the brain,
that variability would not induce errors. Downstream structures
would know that the 17 spikes it received was anomalous and that
the real signal had magnitude 10.
This leads to another important point. Consider the time that a
spike occurs. In actuality, it was preceded by a particular path
that the membrane voltage took before the voltage threshold
for the spike was attained. This path reﬂects detailed informa-
tion about when the input spikes (excitatory and inhibitory)
occurred. But, because of the presence of noise and the ran-
dom walk of the membrane voltage, there are many paths that
could lead to the identical spike time and many more that could
have led to a range of spike times that would be indistinguish-
able from the point of view of downstream neurons. The detailed
information about the path that led to a particular spike is lost.
Downstream neurons see only the outcome – the spike. They are
not privy to the particular trajectory of membrane voltage that
led to this spike. Thus, downstream neurons do not “know” the
exact cause of the inputs impinging upon them, nor can they
reconstruct this from the data available to them. They cannot
differentiate signal from noise, and any computational characteri-
zationof the processes they supportmust incorporate ineliminable
probabilistic features.
This observation has implications for neural coding. For exam-
ple, it renders implausible a baroque code of information in spatial
and temporal patterns of spikes. That is not to say that which
neurons are active, and when, is not the code of information. Per-
haps, the ﬁne detail of the spike pattern across the population of
neurons – like a constellation of ﬂickering stars – conveys informa-
tion. However, the details of the spike patterns in time – the time
sequence of the ﬂickering – are removed from the neural record.
They are represented in the particular trajectories that the receiv-
ing neurons’membrane voltages undergo between their spikes and
are thus lost in transmission. Other neurons in the brain do not
beneﬁt from this information.
This observation also has important philosophical implica-
tions. It implies a fundamental epistemic break in the ﬂow of
information. From the effect, i.e. the spikes of some set of output
neurons, the system cannot reconstruct its causes (the times of all
the inputs). This means that the variability on the outputs cannot
be predictively accommodated. If in some epoch a neuron emits
ﬁve spikes instead of four, it is often impossible for the brain to
trace this difference to an event in inputs that would lead another
neuron to discount this extra spike as anomalous. Although the
variability can emerge from deterministic processes (no quantum
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effects) it should be viewed as fundamental, because there is no
way to trace it to its source or to negate it.
Noise is at least in part a result of complexity at the synap-
tic level, a manifestation of a chaotic mechanism that balances
excitation and inhibition (Shadlen and Newsome, 1994, 1998;
vanVreeswijk and Sompolinsky, 1996). Indeterministic or chaotic
neural activity has been postulated by some philosophers to make
possible free will (Kane, 2002). Some people (including one of
the authors, Michael N. Shadlen) might be inclined to think that
noise in the nervous system shows determinism to be false (Glim-
cher, 2005). However, without being able to identify the source of
noise, we cannot attribute it, with certainty, either to indetermin-
istic brain events, such as effects of quantum indeterminacy, or to
complex but deterministic processes. And if determinism is true,
the spikes produced at some level of neural organization are com-
pletely caused by prior physical events, and their precise timing
can in principle be accounted for in its entirety. For example, the
ﬁring pattern of neurons that represent momentary evidence are
completely caused by the impulses from other neurons. However,
as argued above, this precise timing does not convey information,
nor can it be exploited for prediction. Sowe arewise to look at spike
rates as a random value with an expectation (or central tendency)
and uncertainty.
We have already noted that this variability has an effect on
behavior, namely on the accuracy and speed of decisions. So it is
a quantity that we ought to care about. Yet, it is useless to try to
account for it by tracing it to more elementary causes. The vari-
ability might as well have arisen de novo at the level we measure
it. Thus, despite the fact that the system may be deterministic in
the physical sense, it cannot be understood properly in terms of
only its prior causes. This is arguably an example of emergence, a
principle that applies to many macroscopic properties in biology
(Anderson, 1972; Mayr, 2004; Gazzaniga, 2011).
The presence of noise implies that there is some uncertainty
involved in every calculation the brain makes. Thus, even if we
know conditions in the world, we cannot be sure about what out-
come they will cause via the workings of a brain that must make a
decision, because it is not clear, even to the brain, exactly what state
it is in. Because the brain operates on noisy data with noisy mech-
anisms, it must enact strategies or policies to control accuracy.
For example it must balance the speed of its decisions against a
targeted accuracy. Such policies underlie distinctions that separate
one decision maker from another, and we will argue that they are
relevant to assessments of free will and responsibility. We explic-
itly deny that the brain or the agent can (always) identify noise as
distinct from signal. However, through experience the agent can
tell that he does not always track the world correctly, or that his
decisions are not the right ones. He thus must learn to modulate
his decisions in order to compensate for uncertainty, where that
uncertainty is generated (at least in part) by noise. For example, a
high error rate might induce the agent to change policy by slowing
down. Neither the agent nor the brain need know about the noise,
but by changing the bound height, the brain (and agent) would
reduce the error rate.
RESPONSIBILITY, POLICY, AND WHERE THE BUCK STOPS
On most moral views, capacities, attitudes, and policies are rele-
vant to assessments of ethical responsibility (e.g., Strawson, 1974;
Wallace, 1998; Smith, 2003). Capacities set broad outlines for
domains of possibility for the engagement of certain functions
important for social agency. Some, such as basic abilities to com-
prehend facts, make valuations, and control impulses may be nec-
essary conditions for responsible agency, whereas consideration of
others, such as perceptual acuity,memory, attentional control, and
mentalizing abilitiesmaymodulate responsibility judgments. Atti-
tudes or policies such as explicit beliefs about moral obligations,
risk-aversiveness, and in/out-group attitudes may affect decision-
making inways that we consider subject tomoral assessment4. The
neuroscience of motivation and social behavior is beginning to
shed some light on the neuroscience of social attitudes, but at this
point only in broad-brush ways that do not yet illuminate mech-
anism. Policies are high-level heuristics that affect the parameters
of decision-making and can bemodulated in a context-dependent
way. These include the relative weighting of speed versus accuracy,
the relative weighting given to different types of information, and
the cost assigned to different degree of expected error. Some of
these elements are formalized mathematically in decision theory
(Jaynes, 2003). Our focus here will be on policies.
In Section “Neurobiology of Decision-Making,” we suggested
that neuroscience is beginning to expose the brain mechanisms
that establish at least some such policies. The speed–accuracy
tradeoff is a paradigmatic example. We focus here on the tradeoff
between speed and accuracy because it is something we are begin-
ning to understand (Palmer et al., 2005;Hanks et al., 2009). Neural
mechanisms responsible for other decision policies are probably
not far behind. In principle, the same kinds of mechanisms that
operate on perceptual decisions are probably at play in social deci-
sions (Deaner et al., 2005), economic decisions involving relative
value (Glimcher, 2003; Sugrue et al., 2005; Lee, 2006), and deci-
sions about what (and whether) to engage – deciding what to
decide about (Shadlen and Kiani, 2007, 2011).
That policies can have a role in the assessment of responsibility
is plain. Policies are malleable, context-dependent, and pervasive.
Consider the following outcomes due to decisions made by two
doctors. DoctorAmade a hasty, inaccurate diagnosis of her patient
because she valued speedover accuracy.DoctorB,valuing accuracy
more than speed, made a correct diagnosis, and saved the patient.
Doctor C, also valuing accuracy over speed, failed to act in time to
stanch the bleeding of his patient. Decisions cannot be explained
in the absence of considerations of policy, and the suitability of
policies must be tuned to circumstances. These policies are center
stage in our consideration of the qualities of these three doctors’
decisions. It is not the policy itself, but the application of the pol-
icy in particular circumstances that is important: That is why our
moral assessments of Doctor’s B and C differ, even though they
have the same policy. On the other hand, even if Doctor B had not
saved the patient due to chance factors she could not control, we
would have no grounds for moral sanction. Thus, it is the policy,
not just the outcome, that is relevant to moral assessment.
Recent work indicates that policy elements of decision-making
are beginning to be explicable in neural terms. Importantly, the
4It is not clear how to distinguish attitudes and policies. We refer to them as if they
are different, but it could just be that we have the beginning of an understanding of
the neural basis of policies and how they affect decision-making, but so far no real
handle on the neural realization of things we consider attitudes.
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elucidation of the neural mechanism that gives rise to policy does
not explain the policy away, nor does it make it less relevant to
ethical assessment. Policies may be chosen poorly, but they are
also revisable. So over time, policies should better track what they
must accomplish. Agents can be morally assessed for failing to
revise. Indeed setting a policy often requires decisions (as well as
learning and other factors). The process might also be subject to
noise and uncertainty, but again, the noise neither confers freedom
nor lack of responsibility; it invites consideration of policy affect-
ing decisions about policy. These policies are also targets for moral
assessment. For example, Doctor A in the story, whomade a hasty,
inaccurate diagnosis of her patient because she valued speed over
accuracy, might ask us to excuse her action on the grounds that
her policy, favoring speed, was merely the outcome of noise. The
argument concerns policy and thus has bearing on our evaluation,
but it is not compelling, because one would counter (in effect) that
training inmedicine should lead to non-volatile policies,which are
resilient to noise, emotional factors, distraction, and sleep depri-
vation. However, were Doctor A poisoned by a drug (or disease
process) that affected the bound-setting mechanism, we might be
inclined to accept this fact as mitigating.
The important insight is that the neurobiology is relevant in the
sense that it points us toward the consideration of policy in our
moral assessments. We may not have direct access to the internal
policy in the way we can observe an act, but we can infer set-
tings like bound height from behavioral observations, just as we
can infer accuracy. We also have direct access to the agent’s com-
munications about these policies. Although indirect and possibly
non-veridical, they are expressions of metacognitive states – analo-
gous to conﬁdence – concerning a decision. Thus, when we engage
in ethical evaluation of a decision or act, policy is one natural place
to focus our inquiry.
To recap, we have argued that ineliminable noise in neural sys-
tems requires the agent to make certain kinds of commitments in
order to make decisions, and these commitments can be thought
of as the establishment of policies. Noise puts a limit on an agent’s
capacities and control, but invites the agent to compensate for
these limitations by high-level decisions or policies thatmay be (a)
consciously accessible; (b) voluntarily malleable; and (c) indica-
tive of character. Any or all these elements may play a role in
moral assessment. It remains to be seen how such information
about policy might bear upon our view of free will and responsi-
bility. The answer will depend in part on what one’s basic views
on free will and responsibility are. It will also depend on whether
the arguments about noise are taken to illustrate a purely epis-
temic limitation about what we know about the causes of our
behavior, or whether one can muster arguments to the effect that
a fundamental epistemic limitation brings with it metaphysical
consequences.
One of us (Adina L. Roskies), thinks that policy decisions are
a higher-level form of decision that establishes parameters for
ﬁrst-order decisions, and that to the extent that policies are set con-
sciously or deliberately, or are subject to feedback from learning,
policy decisions should be considered signiﬁcant in attributions
of responsibility, and the ability of the agent to manipulate them
as important in attributions of free will. It is possible that pol-
icy decisions should be considered signiﬁcant in attributions of
responsibility even when they are set without conscious delibera-
tion. Another of us (Michael N. Shadlen), agrees with the above,
and in addition holds that the special status of policies is also
a consequence of their emergence as entities orphaned from the
chain of cause and effect that led to their implementation in neural
machinery. This will be explained further in the next section.
Does the fact that we cannot know the precise neural causes
of some effect mean that we can conclude that they are in some
relevant sense undetermined? If one rejects the notion that the
unpredictability of noise entitles one to take the noise as funda-
mentally equivalent to indeterminacy – because the limitations are
only epistemic in character – the noise argument cannot be used to
argue for the falsity of determinism and the consequent falsity of
positions tied to the truth of determinism. Thus, the focus on poli-
cies does little to address the worries of the hard incompatibilist.
However, those with compatibilist leanings might think like
this: As a compatibilist, your concerns are not with the truth
of determinism or indeterminism, or even with predictability.
Instead, you think that capacities and other properties of agents are
the criteria upon which to establish responsibility. For example, if
you think that responsibility judgments are relativized to the infor-
mation available to an agent, then noise, whether deterministic or
indeterministic, puts limits on perfect information and forces the
agent to make policy decisions based on prior experience. This is
just an augmentation of the imperfect information or uncertainty
that we already take to exist in decision-making. If one accepts that
mechanism need not undermine mindedness, then we can exam-
ine whether policies are based on conscious decisions/intentions,
and whether agents can be held accountable for how policies are
set. The plasticity of this system will undoubtedly be an impor-
tant aspect of responsibility. Notice that this same reasoning can be
applied to decisions themselves (or, perhaps only decisions for rea-
sons that the agent is aware of), so it is not clear we get anywhere
with traditional philosophical problems, but it does point to an
aspect relevant to moral assessment that is often overlooked, and
for which we have some insight fromneuroscience. The important
point the science gives us is that the policies are necessitated not
by indeterminism but by noise, an established physical fact that
all sides can agree on. This makes the traditional debate about
determinism/indeterminism moot, and instead puts emphasis on
the importance of capacities and how they ground responsibility.
Moreover, if one thinks that the information available to the agent
is an important factor toweigh in assessments of responsibility, the
recognition of noise puts important limits on even ideal measures
of that quantity.
Suppose, on the other hand, you argue that the ineliminabil-
ity of noise, and the information loss it results in, provides a
basis for a belief in indeterminism5. You may try to leverage an
5One of us (Michael N. Shadlen) believes this is the case: the limitation imposed by
noise is not merely epistemic; it represents indeterminacy that is fundamental. This
is because the complexity of the brain magniﬁes exponentially the ﬁnite variation in
initial state. This ﬁnite variation is a property of nature, not a consequence of mea-
surement imprecision. It is the notion of inﬁnite precision that is ﬁctional (invented
for the calculus). This variation leads to exponential divergence of state in chaotic
(deterministic) processes. Because this variation cannot be traced back in time to its
original causes, chaos supports metaphysical (as well as epistemic) indeterminacy.
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argument that will be persuasive to the scientist who is tempted
by incompatibilism, but one who is worried about scientiﬁc
reductionism rather than determinism, and thus worried that
neuroscience will explain away agency.
Here would be a sketch of such an argument: Brain states
including those that underlie the establishment and implemen-
tation of high-level policies in decision-making possess low-level
explanations and causes.However, due to the information loss that
noise engenders, there is a fundamental limitation to the kinds
of reductionist accounts that will be available. The inability to
offer a reductionist explanation is an epistemic limitation, but
one could argue that the due to noise, high-level brain states or
processes, including the policies that are developed to deal with
noise, represent a form of emergence.
The argument for emergence is analogous to one that the evolu-
tionary biologist, ErnstMayr,made regarding species. In principle,
we can trace the sequence of events leading to the evolution of
zebras, for example, from early vertebrates, but we do not recog-
nize this causal accounting as being fully explanatory. The chain
of cause and effect in evolution – here the path of evolution from
early vertebrates – could have diverged vastly differently from the
one we can piece together in retrospect. This vastness of possibility
follows from the mechanism of evolution, and in brief, this degree
of divergence necessitates that we cannot explain the zebra’s status
as an entity equivalent to “early vertebrates plus the mechanism
of evolution,” since there are multiple ways evolution might have
gone. Thus we postulate the ontological independence of the zebra
in our biological theories. A similar argument can be made with
respect to causal processes in the brain that lead to the establish-
ment of policy. Emergence does not contradict the fact that a chain
of cause and effect led to a brain state. But it does imply that we
cannot explain a behaviorally relevant neural state solely in terms
of its causal history; too much of the entire causal history would
be needed to account for the ﬁnal state. And because in human
interaction we need to explain behaviors, and explaining behavior
is important for assessments of moral responsibility, we have to
stop trying to trace back causal chains beyond the noise, and focus
on higher-level regularities such as policy decisions. Thus, if you
object to freedomand responsibility,not because of the presence of
causal chains but because of eliminativist worries that mechanism
precludes responsibility, we urge you to consider the following:
First, recognize that policies are real and ineliminable aspects of
decision-making,necessitated by the limited information available
to neural systems. Second, take these high-level policy decisions as
a basis for responsibility assessments.
In other words, if noise in the brain arises from a mechanism
that is analogous to the emergence phenomenon in evolution it
might imbue brain states with the same type of status that a species
has in evolution – an ontologically real entity. If this were to hold
for policy, then an incompatibilist might be nudged toward expla-
nations of decisions that recognize irreducible elements in the
brain of the decision maker, elements that cannot be explained
away on the basis of prior causes. These elements can provide
a basis for accountability and responsibility that focuses on the
agent, rather than on prior causes.
That said, if you are a hard incompatibilist, and reject freedom
and responsibility on the grounds that neither determinism nor
indeterminism can support freedom, the foregoing argument for
freedom and responsibility may not move you at all, for policies
themselves have a causal basis, and the same arguments that block
responsibility in the ﬁrst-order case will also block it in the case of
higher order policies.
FINAL REMARKS
We have attempted to account for the role of noise in decision-
making, based on an understanding of the underlying science. Our
philosophical conclusions are modest. For example, we do not say
much here explicitly about freedom, although we think the points
made here will prove relevant to considerations of freedom in the
neural context. We have, however, argued that:
(1) Neural noise is relevant to the understanding of agency, free
will, and moral responsibility.
(2) Noise is relevant to these questions for its effects on decision-
making, not because it addresses the question of determin-
ism/indeterminism.
(3) Policies, and related ways of managing noise and uncertainty,
are appropriate objects of moral consideration. This is true
whether you think of them as resulting from or exemplify-
ing relevant capacities of an agent, or whether you argue that
policies are emergent properties of agency.
This argument might have further implications for under-
standing and investigating conditions for moral responsibility,
such as:
(1) Investigations of policy mechanisms and their relation to
higher-level control should be a matter of priority for deci-
sion researchers. How policies are set, assessed, and revised
are important elements for a neuroscientiﬁc theory of agency
and a compatibilist theory of responsibility.
(2) The importance of policies suggests that diseases that affect
policy mechanisms should be thought of as having particular
bearing upon moral responsibility.
(3) Although we have not explicitly argued for this here, it is plau-
sible to think that agents might be held morally responsible
even for decisions that are not conscious, if those decisions
are due to policy settings which are expressions of the agent.
(4) If this is true, it puts pressure on the argument that agents act
for automatic and not conscious reasons (Sie and Wouters,
2008, 2010), and thus cannot be held responsible for their
actions. If agents can be held responsible for policies that in
some sense determine decisions, they can be held responsi-
ble for those decisions, even if they do not have access to the
reasons for those decisions.
SUMMARY
Recent advances in neurobiology have exposed brain mechanisms
that underlie simple forms of decisions. Up until now, the role
played by noise in decision-systems has not been considered in
detail. We have argued that the science suggests that noise does
not bear on the formulation of the problem of free will in terms of
determinism as traditionally thought, but rather that it shifts the
focus of the debate to higher-level processes we call “policies”. Our
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argument is compatibilist in spirit. It implies that NBDM does
not threaten belief in freedom because it discloses the causes of
action. Rather, NBDM sheds light on the mechanisms that might
lead an agent to make one choice in circumstances that might lead
another, even very similar agent to choose differently. We have
not appealed to randomness or noise as a source of freedom, but
rather recognize that such randomness establishes the background
against which policies have to be adopted, for example, for trading
speed against accuracy. We thus offer a glimpse of an aspect of
compatibilism that does not address the compatibility of freedom
with determinism per se, but instead addresses the compatibilism
of responsibility with neurobiology and mechanism. By showing
how choices are made, the neurobiology does not dismiss choice
as illusory, but highlight’s the agent’s capacity to choose.
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